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The number of multinational banks have increased in transition economies in Central and
Eastern Europe, while the amount of real credit has simultaneously decreased. Based on the
cases of Poland and Hungary during the first six years of economic transition this paper
investigates if there is a link between greater international financial competition and less real
credit. I provide a theoretical argument that connects the number of multinational banks to the
availability of capital for domestic banks, and hence to their lending capacity. In support of this
argument, I employ data from both countries' central banks, central statistical offices, and
private institutions, as well as from international institutions, such as IMF and BIS. The evidence
suggests that the increases in efficiency which result from greater competition do not outweigh
the limitations on the capital base of domestic banks. Consequently, I find that the constraints
that international financial competition places on domestic banks to raise their capital leads
them to reduce their commercial lending activities in the early stages of financial liberalization.
JEL Codes: F23; F36; O16; O521
I. Introduction
Bank credit is generally considered a crucial ingredient for investment and growth,
particularly in economies with underdeveloped capital markets. However, while the goal of
financial sector reform is clear, namely better access of borrowers to more credit, the best way
to achieve this goal is contested. Most transition economies have followed the path of financial
liberalization (FL), eliminating or reducing regulatory impediments, such as entry restrictions,
interest rate ceilings and preferential credit allocation, to encourage more financial competition.
According to FL proponents, an economy will benefit from more financial competition and less
regulation as the efficiency of domestic banks improves and the number of financial intermediaries
increases, which should help to reach the goals of better access and more credit (Terrell, 1986;
Pigott, 1986; Fry, 1995; BIS, 1997; The Economist, 1997). A key method to raise competition
and the number of financial intermediaries is the permission of multinational bank (MNB) entry.
The comprehensive implementation of FL was not without obstacles in Central Europe,
though. This was particularly true in Poland where in 1993 MNBs found themselves in the middle
of a political controversy. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the National Bank of Poland (NBP)
disagreed over the wisdom of issuing new licenses to MNBs in the light of growing problems of
domestic banks. Clearly, this disagreement also reflected increasing doubts over the effectiveness
of the rapid transformation of the domestic financial system. Subsequently, the division among
Polish decision makers was only resolved in 1995 when new licenses were again issued to MNBs.
Even more surprising than the fact that almost all Central European economies eventually
introduced and continued on with similar financial market policies in the face of doubts as to their
effectiveness, is that these doubts came to be proven true to some extent. There is substantial
evidence, almost ten years into the transition, that the predictions of the FL framework have not1 While all Visegrad economies share a similar economic history and experience similar trends with respect to
MNBs and real credit, the break-up of the former Czechoslovakia in 1991 (?) limits its  comparability with its
neighbors (Abel, Siklos, and Szekely, 1998).
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materialized. In the wake of FL, two of the earliest transition economies, Poland and Hungary
1,
saw not only the number of multinational banks (MNBs) grow, but also the amounts of disbursed
real loans drop. While real loans decreased by 5.2% in Poland from 1990 to 1995, and by 47.5%
in Hungary between 1989 and 1994 (table 2), the number of MNBs increased from 0 to 14 in
Poland and from 9 to 20 in Hungary. These trends are particularly interesting considering the
economic improvements in both countries since 1992 and 1993, respectively, which should have
together with a greater number of banks increased the total amount of real credit (table 1).
Obviously, hindsight is 20/20 and one may argue that exceptional circumstances have
prohibited Poland and Hungary so far from reaping the full benefits of FL. However, the financial
market developments in Poland and Hungary would not come as such a surprise if a more realistic
theoretical perspective of financial markets is employed. As mentioned earlier, the implementation
of full fledged FL is contested, not only among policy makers, but also among academics. In
particular, a more critical view towards MNB entry, at least in the early stages of FL, exists.
Opponents of early financial competition fear that it may have detrimental effects on the
development of the domestic infant banking industry, particularly in transition economies, possibly
even to the extent that domestic commercial banks may disappear (Corbett and Mayer, 1991;
Stiglitz, 1992). Obviously, this infant banking industry argument is more than nationalistic
rhetoric. It is, in fact, a more realistic framework for examining these issues since it incorporates
a dynamic assessment of financial markets. Moreover, due to the heavy concentration in Central
European banking systems, declines in credit by domestic banks - the infant industry - could
explain a significant part of the observed real credit decline.
If opponents of FL are correct that early MNB entry may have an adverse effect on credit3
disbursement, the rapid growth of MNBs, particularly in Hungary, has to be considered one of
the reasons for the slow recovery of the transition economies from their initial recessions. Six
years after the transformation began in Hungary and in Poland, real GDP per capita had yet to
reach pre-transformation levels (table 1). This slow growth may be attributable to slow investment
growth, which in turn can be linked to sluggish or negative real credit growth (Calvo and
Corricelli, 1993; Weller, 1998).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I present an argument as to how
greater international competition in the early stages of FL could result in decreasing real credit
in section II. A brief history of the Polish and Hungarian banking systems follows in section III,
and section IV presents the empirical evidence from the Polish and Hungarian transition in support
of my hypothesis. Finally, some concluding remarks follow in section VI.
II. Infant Banking Industry and Real Credit
The majority of policy recommendations and implemented policies for financial sector
reform in Central Europe are based on the traditional McKinnon-Shaw FL framework. For
instance, the elimination of financial market restrictions in general (Calvo and Frenkel, 1991;
Fischer and Gelb, 1991; Kaser and Allsop, 1992; Calvo and Kumar, 1993), and the permission
of early international financial competition have been recommended (Schmieding and Buch, 1992)
on the basis of this framework. FL proponents take as their starting point the assertion that
developing economies faces excess demand for loans since financial markets are often repressed
due to government intervention. Thus, the elimination of government regulations, such as entry
restrictions, interest rate ceilings, or preferential loan requirements, should raise the credit supply
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). More specifically, early MNB entry is regarded as an easy and2 Domestic banks were further burdened with their old technology, and staff.  
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quick way to introduce market discipline by importing foreign expertise, banking know-how and
bank capital. With greater market discipline domestic banks should become more efficient in the
use of their resources, and ultimately increase their provision of loans.
However, this benign view of international competition, ignores the crucial value of
information for financial firms. If borrowers and lenders do not have perfect information about
each other, borrowers may not be able to obtain the necessary amount of finance for their
investments (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1982; Gertler, 1988; Bernanke 1993), while banks - like other
firms - may have limited access to equity capital (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990). With respect to
the effect of  competition on financial firms, two different outcomes are now possible depending
on a bank's net worth (Stiglitz, 1993). If a bank's net worth remains above a safety threshold the
bank will not increase its lending unless its net worth increases, but once its net worth falls below
that safety threshold the bank will increase its lending, particularly for high risk high projects,
since it stands to lose little or nothing. The dilemma, though, is that financial competition may
further limit banks= ability to raise their net worth, and hence they may restrict their lending given
that their net worth is above their safety threshold.
In transition economies the domestic banking system is a newcomer to a relatively
unregulated market environment
2, and hence an infant banking industry with large capital needs.
New capital is necessary to compete, especially with MNBs, once know-how and technology have
been acquired, whereas the presence of MNBs limits the options of domestic banks to raise new
capital. Specifically, more competition lowers interest rate spreads and retained earnings, while
other sources, such as capital markets and public support are already limited.
When faced with greater international financial competition and limited access to new
capital, domestic banks may reduce their lending as long as their net worth remains above their3 This still leaves the question as to why MNBs are not picking up the slack. As MNBs are largely unfamiliar
with the domestic economy, they restrict themselves, at least in the early stages of FL, to activities that they
know, such as lending to MNCs.
5
safety threshold. The combination of greater competition and less access to capital raises the
chance of bank failure for domestic banks which they may subsequently try to contain by stressing
less risky lending activities over more risky ones, or by reducing their lending overall. Lending to
some market segments, such as to MNCs, or to large domestic corporations, is clearly less risky
than to others, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or to start-up companies.
However, the less risky market segments are likely to be covered already by MNBs who have the
know-how and resources to serve the needs of MNCs or large domestic corporations. By virtue
of their competitive disadvantages, domestic banks are left even more exposed to the more risky
market segments, and hence have few alternatives to reducing their overall lending (Sabi, 1996)
3.
While international financial competition poses a dilemma for domestic banks as it raises
their need for more capital at the same time as it limits access to it, it also seems to create a policy
puzzle. Some limited MNB entry may provide market discipline, and limit rent extraction (Dini,
1991), but it is also seen as detrimental to domestic banks as it prevents them from establishing
a reputation and raising sufficient capital (Stiglitz, 1992). A more protectionist stance, however,
is not necessarily in contradiction to a more open one. Domestic banks may be in need of
temporary protection from international competition so that they could improve their capital,
know-how and technology before international financial competition is permitted to reduce rent
extraction.
Relying solely on the traditional FL framework the connection between greater financial
competition and reduced lending is not apparent. As the traditional McKinnon-Shaw framework
largely neglects the role of information for financial firms, negative repercussions of greater
international financial competition for the credit volume of domestic banks, and, in the case of4 It would be naive to think that there is only one possible explanation for declining real credit, and, as the
following shows, there are indications that other factors may have contributed to the decline in Poland and
Hungary. However, the following evidence supports my argument that international financial competition may
have contributed to the decline in real credit. 
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transition economies, for the total amount of credit are not possible. By linking competition to
capital access we can connect the divergent and seemingly contradictory trends of growing
numbers of financial intermediaries and declining real credit
4. 
III. The Polish and Hungarian Banking Systems
A few developments in Poland and Hungary help to illustrate the inadequacy of the FL
framework to explain financial market developments in transition, and thus lend some initial
support for my argument. Specifically, the Polish and Hungarian banking sectors were and are
heavily concentrated and segmented, and hence insufficiently diversified. Thus, these banks are
sometimes exposed to exceptionally high risks, which - in combination with their sheer size -
makes relatively large amounts of new capital necessary (Mondshean and Opiela, 1997). Also,
both economies opened their financial markets rather quickly to MNBs - with a subsequent rapid
increase in their numbers - which resulted in a steep, and desired, incline in competitive pressures.
Hence, the original prediction, namely lesser market concentration, more financial intermediaries,
and more competition have become realities, and yet, the amounts of real credit have significantly
decreased, mainly because of declining real credit disbursements of old domestic banks. 
The transformed Polish banking system consisted of nine regional banks which were
created by separating the commercial operations from the central bank in February of 1989, added
to five specialized banks which were already separate entities in the centrally planned economy.
The latter consisted of the Bank for Food Economy (BGZ) (serving private and state-owned
agriculture and the food processing industry), the Polish Savings Bank (PeKaO) (the only bank
permitted to collect foreign currency deposits), the State Savings Bank (PKO BP), the Foreign5 The rapid growth of the numbers of MNBs is not reflected in an equally fast growth in credit market share,
which thus understates their competitive impact. First, the numbers exclude the ING and Societe Generale
branches, and the minority shares in four regional and one specialized banks. Second, MNBs operate only in a
few market segments, particularly less risky ones, which increases competition for domestic banks beyond
what is reflected in the overall figures.  
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Trade Bank (BHW), and the Export Development Bank (BRE). 
The 14 state owned banks had a combined credit market share of about 90% in 1990
which dropped to approximately 75% in 1995. Consequently, due to their large market shares,
the observed real credit declines at the regional and specialized banks are in absolute amounts
greater than the economy wide decline in real credit. Market segmentation remains high with
BHW still handling 53% of export and 40% of import transactions, and PKO BP and PeKaO S.A.
retaining large market shares in their areas with 31% of all domestic currency deposits for PKO
BP, and 49% of foreign currency deposits for PeKaO SA at the end of 1994 (PBS). 
Thanks to new license issues the total of Polish owned banks grew to 75 by the end of
1990, while the number of MNBs increased steadily. Initially, two licenses were granted to ING
and Societe Generale for branch offices. Due to regulatory concerns, especially insufficient large
credit restrictions, the MoF and the NBP continued to grant licenses only for subsidiaries after
that. In the Fall of 1993, amid growing concerns about bad loans, low capital levels and
occasional incidences of fraud the MoF and NBP disagreed about the pace of further international
opening. As a result, no new licenses were issued to MNBs until 1995, when the renewed opening
brought the number of MNB licenses to 14 by the end of 1995
5. 
In a manner similar to Poland, the Hungarian financial sector remains heavily segmented
and concentrated with the difference that Hungary's commercial banks are segmented along
industries rather than regions. In 1987, the commercial banking unit of the central bank was
divided into three commercial banks. Magyar Hitel Bank served heavy industry, engineering, and
transport. Kereskedelmi Bank's (K&H) client base comprised agriculture, food processing and6 Three MNBs already operated in Hungary: CIB Bank, Citibank and Unicbank. CIB Bank received a limited
license in 1979 as an off-shore bank, while the other two were established in anticipation of the transformation
process in 1985 and in 1986, respectively. 
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trade. The last, Budapest Bank provided finance to the infrastructure sector. Additionally, three
specialized banks, the Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank, the General Banking and Trust Company,
and the National Savings Bank (OTP), continued operating in the new environment.
The concentration in the Hungarian banking sector is similarly strong as in Poland, even
though it had been declining there, too. Measured by the size of the balance sheets, the five large
Hungarian banks - all of the above with the exception of the General Banking and Trust Company
- had a market share of 82.6% by 1990 which had decreased to 70.2% by 1994 (Anderson and
Kegels, 1998). Hence, the decline of real credit at the purely domestic banks can also explain the
majority of the decline in real lending in the Hungarian economy.
With the political and legal reforms of 1989 more private banks were established bringing
the total to 43 by the end of 1995, of which 23 were at least partially foreign-owned. While a few
foreign banks established limited operations in the early and mid-1980's
6, the pronounced increase
in their number occurred only after the transformation in 1989 (table 6). Despite this rapid growth
in the number of new entrants the market share of domestic banks declined only gradually. 
While the number of financial intermediaries, particularly foreign owned ones, grew in
both economies, the amounts of real loans also declined in both. Moreover, the overall decline in
real loans reflected a decline at the commercial banks, due to the large market shares of the
respective banks (table 7). The decrease in total credit is much more pronounced in Hungary
where it declines by more than 35% as compared to less than 3% in Poland. The same difference
exists with respect to declining loans by the domestic banks with -42% at Hungarian, -27% at
Polish regional and -13% at Polish specialized banks.7 Whereas it is easy enough to realize that Polish and Hungarian banks had large capital needs, it is more
difficult to quantify these capital needs. For once, the number of bad loans - one sign for capital needs - 
increased gradually due to changes in the former Soviet Union and due to legal changes in the transition
economies. Furthermore, repeated recapitalizations in Hungary throughout the period may have had adverse
incentive effects (Anderson and Kegels, 1998). Thus, the fact remains that Polish and Hungarian banks are
requiring new capital for the entire time of our investigation (PBR, 1993, 1994; OECD, 1996; Mondshean and
Opiela, 1997). 
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IV. The Link Between Multinational Banks and Declining Real Credit
Obviously something must be missing in the original FL framework if despite the predicted
initial changes, more banks and greater competition, the expected result is the exact opposite of
what was hoped for, namely declining rather than decreasing real credit. As an alternative view
of international financial competition in the early stages of FL has been presented in section II,
I will provide further empirical evidence supporting this view in this section.
A crucial aspect of the above argument is the connection between greater international
financial competition and the limits it puts on the access to new capital for domestic banks,
especially since such limits may make domestic banks inclined to reduce their loan exposure. The
evidence suggests that throughout the early transition years, Hungarian and Polish banks struggle
to raise their capital levels. For instance, real capital for Hungarian and Polish banks reach their
highest points in the second year of the transition (table 8) - with the exception of the Polish
specialized banks
7. Domestic banks may have found it harder to gain access to new capital with
increased international financial competition because some sources for new capital are virtually
non-existent in transition economies, such as equity markets or government funds, and one main
source, namely retained earnings, is limited exactly because of  greater competition.
Equity markets are very narrow in Poland and Hungary, and hence, they can only play a
limited role for new equity issues. Poland's stock exchange quoted 53 stocks in 1995, Hungary's
stock exchange quoted 40 stocks in 1994, and both stock exchanges had a total valuation of only
about 4% of GDP in 1995 and 1994, respectively (Anderson and Kegels, 1998). Similarly, despite
major recapitalizations by their respective governments the capital needs of domestic banks remain10
high which the governments due to their budget deficits and accompanying growing debt burdens
are less and less likely to meet (Anderson and Kegels, 1998). For instance, the Polish government
continuously produced deficits - since 1993 below 3% of GDP, while the Hungarian government
generated increasing deficits of up to 7.5% of GDP in 1994 (NBP, NBH). Both governments had
also external debt burdens of around 65% of GDP which reduced the possibility for large new
capital injections. By 1994, for example, outstanding debt to the tune of 7.7% of GDP was
already tied to bank restructuring in Hungary.
If equity markets and government financing are limited, retained earnings should remain
as a source for new capital. Since retained earnings are largely a direct result of net interest
income, a rather crude measure for increased competition, namely the spread between loan and
deposit rates, can be calculated. For Hungary, neither the absolute spread nor the spread between
the two rates relative to bank assets shows a clear sign of competitive pressures (Anderson and
Kegels, 1998). On the other hand, in the Polish case, the spread between loan and deposit rates
has clearly declined since 1991 as competition has increased (Mondshean and Opiela, 1997).
To paint a more accurate picture of the impact of competition on capital access for
domestic banks, though, some adjusted profitability ratios can be used. In Hungary, annual profit
and capital are adjusted for bad loans which shows that the ROA of Hungarian banks decreases
until 1993 (table 8) before it increases due to recapitalization efforts by the Hungarian government
(Anderson and Kegels, 1998). For Poland, the capital levels are adjusted for the large and
increasing bad loan burdens which are not fully covered by built up reserves which paints a
different picture than the published balance sheet figures (table 8). Most notably, at the specialized
banks the adjusted real capital decreases now such that it becomes negative for two consecutive
years, 1991 and 1992, whereas the adjusted real capital levels for the regional banks are declining8 The increase in real capital levels at Polish banks is mainly due to the recapitalizations of the Enterprise and
Bank Restructuring Program (EBRP) in 1993, and an additional recapitalization of BGZ in 1994. However,
these put a strain on the $750 million EBRP, while the undertaking of the BGZ recapitalization stretched the
federal budget and was only possible in the political climate at the time, when the Polish Peasant Party
provided the prime minister. 
9 By and large, a capital adequacy ratio of 8% is regarded as adequate, whereas the Polish government
attempted to achieve a 12% ratio. 
10 International financial competition may exert here greater pressure on domestic banks to improve their
technology and know-how than purely domestic competition would. Domestic banks by and large have similar
starting positions, while MNBs have more experience - and more capital - than any Central European bank,
and hence their competitive advantage is likely to create greater competitive pressures than purely domestic
competition could.
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before the turn around in 1993
8. While the situation is improving for domestic banks towards the
end of the period under investigation, the adjusted capital levels are still far from adequate
9. 
Clearly, the available resources were insufficient to raise the capital of domestic banks to
stable levels. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that domestic banks would have increased their
profitability through greater retained earnings in a less competitive situation. However, greater
reported profitability does not necessarily translate into higher capital levels as the adjustments
for bad loan portfolios reveal. Here, MNBs may actually have a positive impact on the capital
levels of domestic banks if they manage to induce them to become more efficient through better
information technologies and improved know-how, despite decreasing interest rate spreads
10.
However, due to the limited access to new capital, improvements in information technology and
know-how are only materializing rather slowly. 
In Poland, the implementation of modern information technologies has begun in several
places, while its speed and scale varies with each bank=s capital level. BRE as the smallest
specialized bank was the first to complete its computerization in 1993, and can now offer real time
transactions (BREE; Annual Reports). Larger banks began to implement integrated networks, but
did not complete these changes before 1995. Finally, the specialized banks with the most extensive
branch networks, and lowest capital adequacy ratios, PKO BP, PeKaO S.A. and BGZ (BREE,
Gazeta Bankowa), were the last to start with their computerization. 11 The only organized efforts to implement modern banking technology and know-how were the so-called
twinning agreements in Poland (World Bank, 1995). However, the realized technology and know-how
transfers from these arrangements were smaller than predicted due to the reluctance on both sides to share vital
information with potential competitors (PBR, 1992).  
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Similarly, the introduction of new technologies in Hungary depends on the access to new
capital for domestic banks. For example, the Foreign Trade Bank and the General Banking and
Trust Co. started computerization in 1993 and completed the task in 1994 with the help of their
foreign minority shareholders (Kerekes, 1995; BREE; Annual Reports). On the other hand,
domestic banks with less access to new capital are slower in implementing new technologies, such
as Budapest Bank and K&H Bank finished the task by 1995, while OTP did not achieve full
computerization before the end of 1995 (Kerekes, 1995; BREE; Annual Reports).
MNBs affect the implementation of information technologies indirectly
11, as domestic
banks that began with the introduction of new information technologies earlier than others
generally have an edge over their competitors and hence can close the gap between themselves
and MNBs (Mondshean and Opiela, 1997). However, due to the limits on access to new capital
that result from international competition, only a small number of domestic banks are able to
introduce new information technologies, and even then, only with several years delay. 
Only the combination of better information technology and improved know-how can raise
the efficiency since the best computers are worth very little if there is not sufficient qualified
personnel who knows how to use them. In particular, Polish and Hungarian banks are in need of
trained professionals who can use the qualitatively and quantitatively improved information to
their advantage, especially in monitoring and supervising borrowers. Central European banks can
use two strategies to raise the know-how at their disposal, namely by training their employees,
or by hiring qualified personnel either from other banks or from other sources.  
One of the preferred strategies is to use outside training sources, such as one of the three
Polish banking schools, or one of the two Hungarian specialized institutions; the other is to hire12 The available data does not allow for a similar calculation for the Hungarian banks. 
13 This ratio is preferred to a measure that includes loan loss provisions since these are more influenced by
regulatory decisions and are counted with a lag (Dahl and Shrieves, 1992). 
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recent college or university graduates (Kerekes, 1995; PBR, 1994; BREE). With respect to hiring
qualified personnel from other banks Polish state-owned banks were hampered by the "excessive
wage tax" for most of the time between 1990 and 1995 which prohibited them from paying going
market rates for qualified personnel, while such a tax did not exist in Hungary. Furthermore,
domestic banks  with low capital bases are generally at a disadvantage to employ or recruit
qualified personnel since higher salaries are a drain on their already limited resources. Not
surprisingly, the banking sector has seen a flow of qualified staff from domestic banks to MNBs.
While domestic banks have clearly recognized the need to improve the factors underlying
the supply of credit, such as bad loan ratios, information technology or banking know-how, these
efforts are severely hampered by their low capital levels. Access to new capital, however, is in
turn restricted by increased financial competition from MNBs in both economies. Hence, domestic
banks may respond to competition by reducing their lending to lower their risk exposure. It
appears that Hungarian and Polish banks did just that by reducing their lending overall and by
shifting the allocation of their resources towards virtually risk free government issues. 
Various factors indicate that the portfolio risk for domestic banks may have slowly
decreased. The bad loan burden of Polish banks - at least - has been slowly decreasing after an
initial increase which is not only shown by the decreasing absolute amounts of bad loans, but also
by their declining share in loan portfolios. Bad loans reached their highest share of total loans at
the regional banks in 1993, and at the specialized banks in 1992
12 
13. Third, a weighted average
of different asset allocations is used to measure asset portfolio risk. Thus, the asset risk of the
Hungarian banking system declines from 1990 to 1994 and from 1991 to 1995 in Poland (table
9).14
Since the weighted average of different portfolio allocations is an aggregate measure over
all banks, old and new, domestic and foreign, it is possible that it underestimates the risk for
domestic banks. Unfortunately, a closer look at domestic banks is only possible in Poland where
sufficient data is available. Here, the bad loan share has increased within the first two years before
it started to decrease slowly in the ensuing years which does not tell the whole story, though, as
bad loan regulations have been enforced more strictly since 1993, and as domestic banks have
been raising their loan loss reserves to the point where they fully meet the required coverage after
1993 (OECD, 1996; Mondshean and Opiela, 1997). Thus, the figures before 1993 are likely
understating the respective bad loan portfolios, and Polish banks have thus reduced their bad loan
portfolios more than the numbers show. Furthermore, the figures for later years clearly are less
severe indicators for portfolio risk as Polish banks have built up their loan loss reserves.
All in all, the figures indicate a declining overall portfolio risk for domestic banks, even
though it remains relatively high for the entire period. Hence, it is not surprising to find that
despite growing deposits and lower profitability, domestic banks are pursuing a greater allocation
in governmental treasury bill. The facts that deposits are growing and that t-bill allocations are
large are noteworthy since they first refute the argument that reductions in loanable funds are the
cause for the decline in real credit, and second they lend further support to the argument that
domestic banks reduced their loans to limit their lending exposure, especially in light of limited
access to new capital. 
As already mentioned, real deposits grew at most domestic banks, despite declining real money
levels. Overall, in both countries, real money declined slightly due to tight monetary policies with
some fluctuations after the initial decreases (table 10). Decreases in the supply of real money are
unlikely to have affected the supply of real loans, though, particularly as Hungary and Poland are
both relatively disintermediated (table 10). The relative financial disintermediation is  reflected by14 A possible explanation for the divergence of the regional banks from the overall trend may be that the
regions served by some of the large regional banks, particularly in the mining area around Katowice or in the
textile producing town of Lodz, have been hit harder by the initial recession and took longer to recover than
others (Dabrowski et al., 1994).
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the fact that about 20% of M2 is in the form of cash holdings in Hungary (NBH), and between
16% and 18% in Poland (NBP, IMF). Hence, there is still some room for banks to attract more
liabilities even if real money declines - which is the case for Polish specialized banks and
Hungarian domestic banks, leaving only Polish regional banks with declining real deposits
14. 
As access to deposits does not seem to be an issue for most domestic banks in Poland or
Hungary, our focus shifts to their asset allocation. For all domestic banks, the loan to deposit ratio
increases in the second year and then falls in the following years before it rebounds in the last year
of our investigation (table 10). The changes are rather similar for all domestic banks with an
overall drop in the loan to deposit rate by 20 percentage points from their peak to their bottom.
Hence, conscious decisions to reduce loan exposure and the associated risk at domestic banks
appears to be a more plausible explanation than a decrease in the availability of loanable funds. 
One explanation for the changing allocation of Polish and Hungarian banks may simply be
that other fund uses have become less risky and more profitable. In fact, all Polish and Hungarian
banks invest 15-30% of their assets in t-bills. Moreover, Polish banks increased their allocation
in t-bills continuously from 3.97% in January 1992 to 12.19% in December 1995 (NBP).
Considering that real t-bill rates are negative for quite some time, and that the interest rate
differential between loans and t-bills is significantly positive in Poland and growing in Hungary
(table 10), the large and growing t-bill allocations are likely to be a reflection of domestic banks=
desire to reduce their risk exposure. Banks may increase their allocation in t-bills even if the real
interest rate on t-bills is negative or interest rate spreads are large if the risk of commercial loans
is too high. Even though the portfolio risk decreases in Hungary overall between 1989 and 1994
and at Polish banks between 1991 and 1995, the remaining portfolio risk may still be too high for15 The share of GDP produced by private companies in Poland has increased from 30.9% in 1990 to about 60%
by the end of 1995 (GUS, 1995; PAIZ, 1997). In 1990, private companies in the industrial sector employed
27.3% of the workforce, but received only 15.2% of all industrial sales. In 1993, private firms in the industrial
sector employed 41.8% of the workforce and generated 37.4% of industrial sales in 1993 (Chmiel and
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domestic banks since access to new capital which could help compensate for this risk is not
sufficiently available, and thus less profitable t-bill issues are still more attractive.
As portfolio allocations change at domestic banks away from commercial lending as a
result of greater international financial competition obviously some borrowers should become
credit constraint unless demand for bank loans is declining even faster. However, in an expanding
economy credit demand is likely to grow to finance investments, and hence to fuel further growth.
Overall, both economies have been improving as indicated by GDP growth, unemployment rates
and inflation rates (tables 1 and 12). As the new market based systems are slowly approaching pre-
transition period output levels in Hungary, and are even growing beyond those in Poland, the
percentage of loans to GDP continually decreases in Hungary for the entire period, and in Poland
since 1991. Despite the overall improvements the credit growth lags behind the economic growth.
If the discrepancy between economic growth rates and credit growth rates are caused by
sluggish demand for bank credit, we should be able to trace this back to either declining
investment needs, or an already high firm indebtedness. However, investment needs of old state
owned enterprises (SOE), as well as new private businesses are great. The new market based
environment has put pressure on firms to modernize their production facilities to remain
competitive. Considering the outdated equipment that the SOEs used, modernization of
production facilities will take several years, which makes it unlikely that slowed demand for credit
is a reason for the decline (Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Abel, Siklos, and Szekely, 1998; Anderson
and Kegels, 1998; Weller, 1998). Similarly, capital needs of start-up companies are high in the
early years of operation, and hence it is unlikely that demand for debt financing has slowed down
in the most dynamic companies, either
15. Pawlowska, 1995). Similarly, the private sector as a whole produced 60% of GDP with 63% of the labor force
(PAIZ, 1997).  
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Demand for more debt financing may be dampened, though, by the fact that industries are
highly leveraged in Poland and Hungary. Corporate debt is a necessary tool to finance investment
as long as the greater costs of obtaining debt financing as compared to internal finance are not
reducing the firm=s cash flow unduly. Due to the often observed cost wedge between debt and
equity finance, however, greater leverage reduces a firm=s ability to undertake desired
investments (Ndikumana, 1996a, 1996b). Thus, a firm may use increased cash flows in an
expanding economy to reduce its outstanding debt. In Central Europe, though, industries are
heavily credit constrained, such that increased leverage can still lead to greater investment outlays
(Abel, Siklos, and Szekely, 1998; Weller, 1998)). The only impediment to more borrowing may
be that the real costs of borrowing are significantly increasing. However, real loan rates are
declining in the first years of the transition in Hungary, and even though they are initially growing
in Poland, they are still either negative or reasonably low (table 10). Furthermore, in the year with
the highest real interest rate in Poland, namely in 1995, real credit disbursements are also growing
again.
Despite the implementation of FL policies designed to reduce excess demand for credit,
it is, in fact, growing in both economies due to reduced supply and increasing demand. So far, the
declining supply of real credit has been attributed to a lack of access to new capital in the face of
high risk. Obviously, there are other explanations for the decline in credit. First, domestic banks
may initially have been reluctant to enforce loan repayments in a recession as this would have
reduced the chances of future repayments (Begg and Portes, 1993; Dittus, 1994; Mondshean and
Opiela, 1997). Thus, they may have enforced tighter standards once the economy has improved.
Second, stricter enforcement of bad loan regulations may have forced banks to act on their
significant bad loan portfolios which resulted from soft budget constraints (Mondshean and18
Opiela, 1997). Third, creditors may have become less optimistic about repayments of their loans
and thus reduced their lending activities early in the transition (Calvo and Coricelli, 1993). A
related point may be that banks may simply have improved their screening of loan applicants.
Neither of the above three explanations are completely convincing since they are either not
fully supported by the existing data or they leave substantial periods of time uncovered. For
instance, the hypothesis that banks may have accommodated state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to
keep them solvent until better economic times may explain the increase of credit in the second
year, but it is contradicted by the decline in real credit in the first year of the transition (table 2).
Furthermore, Dittus (1994), Weller (1998) and Abel et al. (1998) find evidence that commercial
banks seemed to be enforcing hard budget constraints early in the transition, and that industries
were in fact credit constrained. Similarly, stricter enforcements of bad loan regulations did not
take place in Poland until the second half of 1993 (Mondshean and Opiela, 1997). Finally, better
know-how and technology which would have allowed domestic banks to better evaluate their
borrowers happened very slowly. Hence, banks should have become more optimistic about loan
repayments and should have raised their credit exposure in an improving economic situation.
V. Conclusion
Considering the empirical evidence, it appears that the limiting effect MNBs have on the
access of domestic banks to new capital cannot be disregarded as one factor explaining the overall
decline in real credit. That the limited access to new capital has reduced domestic banks= desire
to expand their loan portfolios should also be viewed in connection with the declining, yet still
high risk levels for all domestic banks. While there may be other explanations for the decline of
credit, these do not contradict the one presented here. On the contrary, the high observed risk
levels, especially the bad loan portfolios, are providing the rationale for giving an infant banking19
industry sufficient access to new capital. Since international financial competition, however,
reduces access to new capital, the probability of bank failure increases and with it the likelihood
that banks reduce their loan exposure. Thus, the solutions to the problems of domestic banks in
Eastern Europe are limited by increased international financial competition. 
Intensified international competition and its negative impact on real lending may be
acceptable if in return MNBs positively impact the efficiency of domestic banks, or if MNB
lending compensates for the decline in purely domestic credit. Both was not the case in Central
Europe. Without sufficient access to capital, domestic banks are restricted in their efforts to
improve information technologies and know-how to become more efficient. Also, while the
decline in real lending has been dampened by new MNB lending to the tune of $811 million in
Poland by the end of 1995, and of $729 million in Hungary by the end of 1994 (BIS), it has
obviously not been enough to compensate the reduced domestic lending. As the benefits from
greater international financial competition did not materialize in the early stages of FL, the
domestic economy may be adversely affected by the lack of commercial lending, and the
subsequent reduction in investment (Weller, 1998), especially in dynamic new companies (Abel,
Siklos, and Szekely, 1998; Anderson and Kegels, 1998). 20
Appendix: 
A. Tables 



















1989 2001.6 213644 0.3 17.0 - - - -
1990 2079.5 201670 1.9 28.9 6067000 1470 6.1 249.3
1991 1737.8 179822 7.5 35.0 5042581 1197 11.5 60.4
1992 1689.3 172767 12.3 23.0 4966102 1167 13.6 44.3
1993 1758.3 170629 12.1 21.1 4891281 1152 15.7 37.6
1994 1804.0 177094 10.4 18.8 5100813 1166 16.0 29.5
1995 - - - - 5703127 1260 14.9 21.6
Sources: NBH, Monthly Reports, various issues; NBP, Information Bulletin, various issues; IMF,
International Financial Statistics, various issues; GUS, Statistical Bulletin, various issues. 














1989 916.8 -1.4 544.5 -4.7 - - - -
1990 968.3 5.6 638.2 17.2 118241 -44.5 151017 -61.1
1991 715.0 -26.2 605.7 -5.1 119547 1.1 139980 -7.3
1992 593.1 -17.1 629.0 3.9 105203 -12.0 138861 -0.8
1993 500.5 -15.6 606.5 -3.6 104146 -1.0 144189 3.8
1994 481.7 -3.8 597.4 -1.5 100715 -3.3 157647 9.3
1995 - - - - 112079 11.3 168945 7.2
%   - 47.5 - 9.7 - - 5.21 - 11.87 -8.2
Sources: NBH, Monthly Reports; NBH, Annual Reports; NBP, Information Bulletin21





Years Real Deposits Real Loans
a Crdt. Mkt Share
(%)
Real Deposits Real Loans Crdt. Mkt. 
Share (%)
1990 70171.3 52615.0 44.5 42661.1 51862.4 43.9
1991 48454.0 45477.4 32.6 74908.8 54148.6 38.8
1992 48904.9 37813.8 32.4 81510.9 48494.7 41.6
1993 48307.3 32723.5 28.2 80337.5 42760.2 36.8
1994 50887.8 32768.6 30.6 90961.3 43401.8 40.5
1995 49751.7 38600.9 33.5 91423.6 44898.3 39.0
Change -29.1% -26.6% -11% 114.3% -13.4% -4.9%
a) Real loans comprise zloty and currency denominated loans to private households, enterprises
and the government. Hence, the denominator for the calculation of credit market share is different
from the amount of real commercial loans reported in table 2 in that "loans to the budget sector"
(NBP) are included here.  
Sources: NBP, Information Bulletin; Gazeta Bankowa 
Table 4: Multinational Banks in Poland






1991 6 343.3 403.2 0.4
1992 7 1551.9 872.4 0.7
1993 7 1649.6 930.3 0.7
1994 7 4270.2 1768.4 1.5
06.1995 9 3420.5 2223.8 1.9
12.1995 14 - - -
Sources: Gazeta Bankowa; NBP, Information Bulletin22
Table 5: Domestic Banks in Hungary











a) Real loans comprise HUF and currency denominated loans to private households, enterprises
and the government. Hence, the denominator for the calculation of credit market share is different
from the amount of real commercial loans reported in table 2 in that “loans to the government”
(NBH) are included here.
Sources: G. Kerekes, Hungarian Financial and Stock Exchange Almanac; HBA, Annual Reports;
NBH, Monthly Reports
Table 6: Multinational Banks in Hungary
Year Number of MNB Real Deposits (bio. HUF) Real Loans (bio. HUF)
1990 8 28.6 46.2
1991 10 55.9 58.1
1992 12 68.7 46.6
1993 17 79.6 50.9
1994 18 111.8 92.7
Sources: NBH, Monthly Report, various issues; G. Kerekes, Hungarian Financial and Stock
Exchange Almanac, various issues. 23
Table 7: Real Commercial Credit in Poland and Hungary
a







Poland (in billion PLZ)
Regional Specialized
1989 1814.0 - N.A. - -
1990 1720.6 118241.3 661.3 52615.0 51862.4
1991 1366.3 139522.6 608.2 45477.4 54148.6
1992 1225.8 116699.6 412.2 37813.8 48494.7
1993 1198.6 116097.3 395.1 32723.5 42760.2
1994 1173.8 107072.1 382.5 32768.6 43401.8
1995 - 115225.2 - 38600.9 44898.3
%   -35.3 -2.6 -42.2 -26.6 -13.4
a) These numbers diverge from those presented in table 2 since they include the amount of lending
to the government. 
Sources: NBH, Monthly Report; G. Kerekes; HBA, Annual Report; NBP, Information Bulletin;
Gazeta Bankowa
























1989 52.9 2.1 - - - - - -
1990 79.0 2.0 839.7 444.9 13.1 615.6 468.2 2.9
1991 76.6 0.6 1081.5 438.7 6.4 690.5 -279.0 4.0
1992 61.5 -1.4 841.7 23.2 3.6 811.0 -649.5 0.2
1993 36.5 -7.2 799.6 143.9 4.4 1180.1 365.6 0.5
1994 42.7 0.03 800.7 257.2 4.5 1456.2 866.6 1.4
1995 - - 967.2 551.5 4.2 1420.2 925.2 2.9
a) Adjusted real capital is measured as the difference between the reported capital levels and the
portion of bad loans that is not covered by loan loss provisions. 
Sources: NBH, Monthly Report, various issues; G. Kerekes, Hungarian Financial and Stock
Exchange Almanac, various issues; NBP, Information Bulletin, various issues; Gazeta Bankowa,
various issues. 24
Table 9: Risk Indicators for Hungarian and Polish Banking








Bad Loans (in bio. PLZ)
Loan Portfolio Risk
BL/TTL Ratio (in %)
a
Regional Specialized Regional Specialized
1989 0.51 - - - - -
1990 0.53 - 3083.69 1914.15 5.86 3.69
1991 0.52 0.56
b 7527.34 9127.41 16.55 16.86
1992 0.49 0.57 8996.74 14718.96 23.79 30.35
1993 0.46 0.56 10252.06 12425.13 31.33 29.06
1994 0.46 0.54 8187.89 12953.04 24.99 29.84
1995 - 0.51 6150.84 11152.09 15.93 24.84
a) This ratio is modeled after the portfolio risk ratio, NON, in Dahl and Shrieves (1992) with BL
as the amount of bad loans in a bank=s portfolio and TTL the amount of a bank=s total loan
portfolio
b) Due to the lack of appropriate data in Poland the risk measure for December 1991 has been
replaced with the risk measure for January 1992. 
Sources: NBH, Monthly Report, various issues; G. Kerekes, Hungarian Financial and Stock
Exchange Almanac, various issues; HBA, Annual Report, various issues; NBP, Information
Bulletin, various issues; Gazeta Bankowa, various issues. 25
Table 10: Real Money and Real Deposits in Hungary and Poland
Year Total Real Money













M1 (%) M2 (%) M1 (%) M2 (%) Regional L/D (%) Specialized L/D (%)
1989 912.7 - 22 41 - - N.A. N.A. - - - -
1990 914.3 190596 25 44 17 34 937.8 70.6 70171.3 75.0 42661.1 59.8
1991 881.3 147716 25 47 13 32 818.3 74.3 48454.0 93.9 74908.8 72.3
1992 912.4 160074 27 51 13 36 783.2 52.6 48904.9 77.3 81510.9 59.5
1993 870.3 159112 25 50 13 36 740.5 53.4 48307.3 67.7 80337.5 53.2
1994 827.6 165050 22 46 13 37 692.9 55.2 50887.8 64.4 90961.3 47.7
1995 - 175718 - - 13 36 - - 49751.7 77.6 91423.6 49.1
Chang
e
-9.3% -7.8% - - - - -26.1% - -29.1% - 1.143 -
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; NBH, Monthly Report; NBP, Information Bulletin; GUS, Statistical Bulletin26
Table 11: Real Interest Rates in Hungary and Poland
Year Hungary Poland
Loans T-Bills (Loans 
- T-Bills)
Interbank Loans T-Bills (Loans
- T-Bills)
Interbank
1989 5.8 3.5 2.3 - - - - -
1990 3.2 1.2 2.0 - -188.3 - - -191.6
1991 0.5 -0.5 1.0 - -11.4 - - -10.1
1992 5.8 -0.3 5.5 -0.7 5.2 -9.1 14.3 -1.2
1993 4.5 -3.9 8.4 2.8 7.4 -7.9 15.3 -1.1
1994 10.9 8.1 2.8 13.2 10.7 -3.7 14.4 -0.1
1995 - - - - 12.5 1.52 11.0 0.7
Sources: NBH, Monthly Report, various issues; NBP, Information Bulletin, various issues. 
Table 12: Lending and Growth in Hungary and Poland
Year Hungary Poland
GDP Growth Loans/GDP GDP Growth Loans/GDP
1989 3.21 45.80 - 27.56
1990 3.89 46.56 -21.53 19.49
1991 -16.43 41.15 -16.89 27.67
1992 -2.79 35.11 -1.52 23.50
1993 4.08 28.46 -1.51 23.74
1994 2.6 26.7 4.28 20.99
1995 - - 11.81 20.20
Sources: NBH, Monthly Report, various issues; NBP, Information Bulletin, various issues.27
B. Data Sources
AmerBank S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Bank Zachodni S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Bank Gdanski S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Bank Slaski S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Bank Rozwoju Eksportu S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Bank Handlowy S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Banking Research in Eastern Europe (BREE), Bank Rating Reports, various issues, Cyprus:
BREE
BGZ S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Central Statistical Office (GUS), Statistical Bulletin, various issues, Warsaw: GUS
Citibank S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Creditanstalt S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Gazeta Bankowa, Monthly Bank Rankings, various issues, Warsaw: Gazeta Bankowa
Hungarian Banking Association, Annual Report 1992, Budapest: TAS Ltd.
Hungarian Banking Association, Annual Report 1994, Budapest: TAS Ltd.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics, various issues, 
Washington D.C.: IMF
International Bank in Poland S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Kerekes, Gyorgy, 1991, Hungarian Financial and Stock Exchange Almanac 1990-91, 
Budapest: TAS Ltd.
Kerekes, Gyorgy, 1992, Hungarian Financial and Stock Exchange Almanac 1991-92, 
Budapest: TAS Ltd.
Kerekes, Gyorgy, 1993, Hungarian Financial and Stock Exchange Almanac 1992-93, 28
Budapest: TAS Ltd.
Kerekes, Gyorgy, 1994, Hungarian Financial and Stock Exchange Almanac 1993-94, 
Budapest: TAS Ltd.
Kerekes, Gyorgy, 1995, Hungarian Financial and Stock Exchange Almanac 1994-95, 
Budapest: TAS Ltd.
KPMG, Investment in Poland, Third Edition, Warsaw: KPMG Polska Sp. z.o.o.
National Bank of Poland (NBP), “Information Bulletin”, various issues, Warsaw: NBP
National Bank of Hungary (NBH),  Monthly Report, various issues, Budapest: NBH
PAIZ, 1997, Privatisation and Business Infrastructure, from PAIZ - Poland: Fundamental Facts,
Figures and... on http://www.paiz.gov.pl/facts1d.htm
Polski Bank Rozwoju (Polish Development Bank), 1992, The Banking System in Poland 
1991/92, Warsaw: Ministry of Finance
Polski Bank Rozwoju (Polish Development Bank), 1993, The Banking System in Poland 
1992/93, Warsaw: Ministry of Finance.
Polski Bank Rozwoju (Polish Development Bank), 1994, The Financial System in Poland
1993/94, Warsaw: Ministry of Finance.
PeKaO S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
PKO B.P., Annual Reports, various issues
Pomorski Bank Kredytowy S.A., Annual Reports, various issues 
Powszcheny Bank Gospodarczy S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Powszcheny Bank Kredytowy S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Raiffeisen-Centrobank S.A., Annual Reports, various issues
Wielkopolski Bank Kredytowy S.A., Annual Reports, various issues29
C. Asset Portfolio Risk 
Based on the theoretical development of the link between asset risk and bank capital levels
by Kim and Santomero (1988), a weighted average has been developed (Keeton, 1991; Dahl and
Shrieves, 1992). The following table summarizes the categories and weights in the original work
by Dahl and Shrieves on the U.S., and its applications to the case of Hungary and Poland in this
paper. The various asset categories are multiplied by their respective weights and then divided by
the sum total of all asset categories. 30
Table A.1: Comparison of Original and Applied Risk Measures
Dahl and Shrieves (1992) Hungary Poland
Category w  Category w Category w
Non-interest Bearing Balances and Currency and Coin 0.0 NA 0.0 Vault Cash 0.0
Interest-bearing Balances 0.25 Credits to Fin. Institutions 0.25 Banks, Bureaux De Change
& Post Office
0.25
Short-term U.S. Treasury and Government Debt Securities 0.1 NA Treasury Bills 0.1
NBP Bills 0.1
Long-term US Government and Agency Debt Securities 0.25 Credits to General Govt..  0.25 Due from Central Govt. 0.25
Treasury Bonds 0.25
State and Local Government Securities 0.5 Credits to Local Govts. 0.5 Due from Local Govt.. 0.5
Bank Acceptances 0.25 NA NA
Fed Funds Sold; Securities Purchased under Agreements to
Resell
0.25 NA NA
Standby Letters of Credit and Foreign Office Guarantees 0.75 NA NA
Loan and Lease Financing Agreements 0.75 Credits to Corporations 0.75 Corporate Loans 0.75
Credits to Households and Small
Enterprises
0.75 Household Loans 0.75
Credits to Non-Profit Organizations 0.75
Commercial Letters of Credit 0.5 NA NA
All Other Assets 1.0 NA Other Securities 1.0
Other Assets 1.0
Sources:  Dahl, Drew, and Ronald E. Shrieves, 1992, “The Relationship Between Risk and Capital in Commercial Banks”, Journal of Banking
and Finance, 16:439-457, 1992.
Keeton, William R., 1991, “New Risk-Based Capital Plan for Commercial Banks” In Robert W. Kolb, Ed., Financial Institutions and
Markets: A Reader, pp. 252-272, Miami: Kolb, 1991.
Kim, Daesik, and Anthony M. Santomero, 1988, “Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation” Journal of Finance 18, 5: 1219-1233,31
December 1988.
National Bank of Poland (NBP), “Information Bulletin”, various issues, Warsaw: NBP
National Bank of Hungary (NBH), “Monthly Report”, various issues, Budapest: NBH
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